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CONTENTS

	Page
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF RURAL COMMUNES IN COMMUNIST CHINA Chu-yuan Cheng	3
COLONIALISM AND THE DANGER OF WAR Mohammad Hatta	10
A NEPALESE HILL VILLAGE AND INDIAN EMPLOYMENT John T. Hitchcock	15
RASAH--A RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE IN MALAYA Hamzah-Sendut	21
WILL SUCCESS SPOIL THE JAPANESE? David W. Plath	27
UNITED STATES AID TO LATIN AMERICA IN CHINESE STUDIES John K. Fairbank and John M. H. Lindbeck	32
Recent Books on Contemporary Asia	36

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THE CHANGING PATTERN OF RURAL COMMUNES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Chu-yuan Cheng

SINCE THE APPEARANCE of the first commune in Suiping District of Honan Province, Central China, in April 1958, the Chinese countryside has experienced a series of drastic changes. By the end of 1958, the 120 million peasant households of the 752,113 agricultural co-operatives had been reorganized into 24,000 people's communes with their 500,000 production brigades and three million production teams. In the three years since, the commune unit has remained relatively stable; its substance, however--including ownership, function, income distribution, and the timetable for the transition to communism--has been altered drastically.

The First Stage: April 1958 to April 1959

Reflecting the fanatical zeal which accompanied the Great Leap Forward, the establishment of rural communes was effected with unprecedented speed in the hope of achieving an immediate entrance into communism. This fanaticism was responsible for radical measures on the part of local cadres. Thus, the communes confiscated all private property and goods; combined free supply with wages in communal distribution; and advocated a military form of existence. The family, regarded as an obstacle, was marked for extinction. Moreover, in several provinces, with the federation of communes along county lines, the membership of the commune unit embraced a half-million persons.

These radical policies received official approbation in the "Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas," which was adopted by the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party on August 29, 1958. This Resolution approved the trend toward county confederations of communes and the seizure of private property. Admitting that the communes were still socialistic in nature, the CCP Central Committee pointed out that they already contained "some elements of ownership by the people as a whole"--elements which, predictably, would experience constant growth. The Committee therefore felt able to declare that the timetable for transition to complete ownership by the people would take "three or four years--in some places longer--five or six years or even longer."

In seeking to implement the provisions of the Resolution, the cadres continued and even intensified their radical policies. The immediate result was widespread sabotage and increasing disturbance

of agricultural production. In recognition of the prevailing discontent of the rural population, the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee convened in Chengchow from November 2 to 10, 1958, to analyze the situation and formulate pertinent corrective measures. This meeting, and a subsequent enlarged meeting of CCP first secretaries of the provincial committees, failed to provide concrete remedies. Nor did a positive correction of policy emerge until the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes" was adopted by the CCP Central Committee at its sixth plenum meeting on December 10 in Wuhan.

Certain major points of this elaborate Resolution call for mention. The communes were again pronounced to be the best means for achieving the transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people, as well as for the subsequent transition from socialism to communism. But the timetable for such transition was revised as the Central Committee admitted that "15, 20 or more years" would be needed for the first stage. Even then, the communes would remain socialist in nature "where the principle of 'from each according to his ability and to each according to his work' still prevails." The achievement of communism, then, became a distant goal rather than an immediate target.

The Resolution also sanctioned a withdrawal in other areas. Commune members were to be allowed to retain their means of livelihood as their private property and to engage in small, domestic, subsidiary occupations on condition that their doing so would not be disadvantageous to collective labor. Similarly, although the free supply-wage system for income distribution was retained, the portion of wages paid for work performed was accorded first place in an effort to increase individual incentive. The peasants were also assured of appropriate freedom of choice within the framework of the free supply system, and were promised twelve hours daily for their meals, sleep and recreation.

The Wuhan Resolution established a system of unified leadership and management at separate levels for communal administration. Thus, the administrative machinery was generally divided into three parts--the management committee at the commune level, the administrative district (or production brigade) level, and the production team. While the latter remained the basic unit of labor organization, the production brigade became the unit that managed industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs in a given area, working on an accounting basis in which gains and losses were pooled for the commune as a whole.

The CCP Central Committee advocated a continuation of the merger of communes within a county, but it was forced to declare that the complicated situation prohibited rapid establishment of communes in the urban areas. To compensate for this disadvantage, the rural communes were urged to engage in industry "in a big way."

The basic importance of this Central Committee directive lay in its recognition that resistance to radical policies had necessitated limited concessions. But even these concessions were not expected to eliminate discontent completely. Thus the Wuhan Resolution also called for an extensive check-up campaign, and demanded that between December 1958 and April 1959 every province, municipality and autonomous region should organize investigation groups. Party secretaries were charged with organizing thousands of these.

The Second Stage: April 1959 to December 1960

Peasant resistance to the communes became more apparent in the early months of 1959, as the failures of the winter engendered widespread bitterness. In particular, the peasants resented the poor communal mess-hall service and the mismanaged nurseries and kindergartens. Their antagonism was expressed in various ways. Far more serious than the work slow-downs, waste of grain and slaughter of livestock were the attacks on cadres and the damage to public property. (As reported in the Ta-kung-pao of October 25, 1958, the peasants placed poison in public fish ponds, recklessly felled fruit trees, and slaughtered cattle and pigs belonging to the communes.) In February 1959 the CCP Central Committee met in Chengchow to formulate further revisions in the commune system. The resulting policy, approved by the CCP Central Committee's seventh plenum in April 1959 in Shanghai, represented the beginning of the second stage of the communes.

Among the first amendments, in the form of greater concessions, was the return of small plots of land to members of communes. As the CCP's official organ, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), observed on April 20, 1959, in the interest of encouraging pig-raising each member should be allotted land not exceeding 5 per cent of the total, as had been the practice previously during the period of advanced cooperatives. Thus private ownership was revived.

Similarly, the Central Committee abandoned its efforts both to federate all of the communes within a county and to encourage the development of communal industry. Since these two measures had been regarded originally as means for promoting the transition to ownership by the whole people, their abandonment indicated that the regime had lost confidence in its ability to accomplish this transition within the foreseeable future.

An amendment of more immediate benefit to the peasants concerned the public mess halls. Teng Tsu-hui, Director of the CCP Central Committee's Department of Rural Works, in an article in Hsin-hua Pan-yüeh-kan (New China Semi-Monthly, No. 12, 1959), publicly acknowledged that the mess halls had inadequate facilities, squandered grain, and caused the peasants to waste time. Following Teng's suggestion that a flexible policy be adopted, grain rations were distributed after the summer harvest to each individual house-

hold instead of to the public dining halls.

The most basic revision formulated at the February meeting in Chengchow was not made public until the convening of the eighth plenum of the CCP Central Committee in August 1959. This was the introduction of the new "Three-Level Ownership System Based on the Production Brigades." The resolution declared: "The right of ownership at the level of the production brigade is basic, and the right of ownership at the commune level is partial. The production teams, too, should enjoy limited ownership." Fundamentally, the three-level system requires two stages for its evolution. In the first the production teams and the commune have only limited ownership rights. In the second stage, coinciding with the vital growth of the economy, the production brigade relinquishes its primary position to the commune organization. This new approach, which in reality entails three stages preceding the transition to ownership by the whole people, is entirely different from the original system. Moreover, the subdivision of the first stage into two steps was really camouflage intended to conceal the great retreat in connection with the rural communes.

Under this new system, the functions of the commune were curtailed drastically. Instead of serving merely as a subordinate component, the production brigade was given responsibility, as an independent operational unit, for administration and production management. The production brigade was made independent in its accounting system, and it acquired control over the teams. It was therefore able to arrange production in accordance with concrete conditions. Crop arrangements, production targets and technical measures had to be discussed by the masses of commune members and decided upon only after joint consultations among the production brigades and teams. The commune was limited to making recommendations and whatever adjustments might be necessary; it could not make direct arrangements or interfere with the production brigade's general plans.

The distribution system also was revised. Although previously the production brigade was required to submit to the commune, now the commune was forbidden to seize any of the public welfare funds retained by the production brigades, and might take over only a small portion of the general reserve fund. Similarly, although, during the first stage of the communes, supply constituted about 50 to 80 per cent of the wage-supply income distribution, the new system called for 70 per cent of the income to be distributed in the form of wages, with larger payments going to those performing the most work.

When the production brigade was made an independent accounting unit, economic relations between brigades and between communes assumed the form of commodity exchanges. As the members of the communes were allowed to possess land and to pursue subsidiary occupations, they were also permitted to sell their products. Conse-

quently, rural fairs, which had been discontinued with the inauguration of the commune system, were reinstituted in 1959.

In sum, these various changes represented a decline in the role of the rural commune from that of a substantial power organization to that of an empty shell. Its authority over the production brigades was reduced to that of the advanced cooperative, which had existed before the emergence of the rural communes.

The Third Stage: October 1960 to the Present

One of the chief reasons for limiting the authority of the commune organization had been the desirability of recognizing differences between rich and poor brigades. The policy of the first stage caused all brigades to be treated equally, and tended to destroy initiative in the better units--a weakness remedied by granting more authority to separate brigades. The new system did not, however, overcome the contradiction between the individual peasant and collective ownership. Consequently, no substantial improvement occurred on the agricultural front even after the adoption of the three-level system. A report made in the summer of 1960 indicated that extensive cultivated land had been abandoned or devastated. Nor did the peasants confine their sabotage to food production: another official report admitted that "bad elements" were responsible for raising the death rate of new-born pigs to as high as 50 per cent during the same period. Because of continuing unrest, the regime was obliged once again to consider additional concessions. This phase marked the beginning of the third stage of the communes.

Since October 1960, there has been a growing tendency to emphasize the role of the production teams in production management. The so-called "four-fixed" and "three guarantees and one reward" systems, which were established during the period of the advanced cooperatives, have been vigorously reinforced. This emphasis on the production team is justified by the Chinese Communist leadership on the ground that the production brigades have proved incompetent in management. Since each brigade includes more than 100 households and approximately 1,000 mou of land, and since its component teams vary widely in relation to concrete conditions, it is reasoned that the brigade's ability to make concrete arrangements is seriously impaired. The production team, on the other hand, comprises only several dozen households, and its labor force is familiar with the characteristics of its land and therefore better able to manage production.

Under the "four-fixed" arrangement, the labor power, land, draft animals and farm implements owned by a brigade are assigned in a fixed manner to production teams. Each team then enters into a contract with the brigade, guaranteeing output, time and costs, as well as a bonus for the team if its output exceeds the assigned

quota. The team then may sow crops, decide technical measures and make its own arrangements for other activities; neither the brigades nor the commune may interfere indiscriminately.

The income of the team depends upon its contracts, its ability to produce a surplus, and its subsidiary occupations. A small portion of this income must be surrendered to the brigade for over-all distribution, but the bulk is distributed among its members after the deduction of a small portion for a general reserve fund. Since each team has its own income level, the pay received by individual members of a commune may differ widely. Moreover, under the "three guarantees and one reward" system, individual incomes vary even within a single team.

Following on the recognition of differences among the brigades, teams and individuals, the principle now stressed in distribution is one of anti-equalitarianism. Party organs and numerous statements now emphasize that differences are objective phenomena. This admission is itself conducive to additional divisions. In distributing the income of production teams, for example, the principle of better pay for more work is emphasized, as is that of higher pay for skilled labor. For those jobs in which labor standards have been set, wage points must be awarded at a piece rate; but for jobs not yet so standardized, wage points are allotted according to an assessment of actual performance.

A concomitant development has witnessed new respect for and even encouragement of the private cultivation of plots and of subsidiary occupations. According to the CCP Central Committee's official organ, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag) of August 10, 1961, such a policy accords with the nature of individual economy. Furthermore, "to let commune members spend their spare time and holidays in developing domestic, subsidiary occupations also helps to increase the social products." It is evident that the prevailing wind is again in the direction of individualism.

THE THREE-STAGE EVOLUTION of the rural communes has been a process of continuous retreat on the part of communist policy. From the original fanatical insistence on an immediate transition to ownership by the whole people, the system has swung full circle and has returned to the old system of allowing individual ownership of private property. In its first stage, the rural commune was a comprehensive socio-economic unit that could be regarded as the embryo of the communist goal of distribution according to need. It expressed the firm intention of abolishing all private ownership as well as the family system. In its second stage, the rural commune stood for the socialist ideal of collective ownership. As in the case of the former advanced cooperatives, the brigades were allowed independence and the peasants were permitted to retain private plots and to resume family life. In its third and present stage, the commune gives a degree of autonomy to the production teams and

acknowledges that basic differences do exist among individuals. Private labor is now encouraged, and the re-opened rural fairs serve as outlets for individual production.

Yet, for the sake of political prestige, the government must retain the label of rural commune even though the substance of the system has been completely altered. The commune really lost its significance after the implementation of the three-level ownership system based on the brigade. The commune can no longer utilize the means of production or interfere with production or income distribution. Having lost its authority in management, it resembles a general without an army. At present its chief function is the exercise of the administrative powers of the former hsiang (townships). Instead of wielding decisive power, the commune has become little more than a consultative organization. The regime still claims that the commune represents a higher level of collectivization since it includes partial ownership at the commune level, integrates government administration, and operates industries, handicrafts and commerce--functions not exercised by the former advanced cooperatives. But since ownership is the key to all economic relationships, ownership by the brigade proves that the system of the advanced cooperative is still the basic one. Since this policy can hardly change in the coming years, the earlier boast that "the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event" appears to be an empty one.

The failure of communalization in China provides a valuable lesson for the whole Sino-Soviet bloc. It demonstrates that the development of agriculture must depend chiefly upon the incentives and initiative of the peasant. And these incentives vary inversely with the degree of collectivization. The failure of the rural communes also demonstrates the correctness of Lenin's assertion that "the peasant class constitutes the last bourgeois class." In the long historical struggle between the communists and the peasantry, the final victory may belong to the peasants.

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COLONIALISM AND THE DANGER OF WAR

Mohammad Hatta

IN THE WORLD TODAY problems of war and peace are at the center of everyone's thoughts. The Berlin question has become acute since Prime Minister Khrushchev's announcement that he would sign a peace treaty with East Germany before the end of this year. The question of banning nuclear-weapons tests is a daily topic of conversation at diplomatic gatherings as well as in barber shops. Conferences on disarmament, which started during the time of the League of Nations, are still in session. The world outlook is gloomy rather than hopeful.

One of several vexed problems in the chess game of international politics concerns colonialism, a matter that is not sufficiently understood in the West. Although it is true that many former colonies have become independent states since World War II, there are still countries which desire to perpetuate and to strengthen colonialism. There was a time when colonial imperialism dominated international politics. But the course of history since World War I has favored the independence of nations. Meanwhile the family of independent states has grown steadily larger.

World War I brought independence to a number of oppressed nations in Central Europe and opened the door to independence for several colonized countries. World War II furthered the process. A great many colonized countries have become independent and have joined the United Nations. Hence it is hypocrisy to suppose that colonialism can be prolonged. To gaze backwards, pining for the days of old "colonial glory," is extremely dangerous.

Present developments display clear proof that colonialism creates a warlike spirit. The colonized nations are opening their eyes wider and are giving increasing thought to obtaining their independence as quickly as possible, the more so since they have seen so many of their sister nations become sovereign and independent. Does mankind need World War III to complete this process, which can be delayed no longer? The disaster that would be caused by a third world war we all know. And, as civilized and intelligent human beings, we must do our utmost to prevent it. If the validity of this statement is acknowledged, why are the fires of colonialism allowed to go on burning, for they will surely set the whole world aflame in a war of annihilation?

The peoples of the Western world are afraid primarily of communism, the influence and power of which increased after each world war. Is the West now preparing to accept another war--a war fos-

tered by the spirit of colonialism--and thus invite communist control of the whole world? This will be an ineluctable consequence.

Each nation, no matter how backward it may be, has the right to independence. Once a nation has become convinced of the rightness of its cause, the ideal of independence can no longer be suppressed, as the histories of India and of Indonesia have demonstrated. Additional evidence may be seen today in the Congo. The ultimate independence of nations that are still colonies is not a matter for argument; it is only a matter of time. In this respect many lessons may be learned from the policy of Britain, which understood and acted wisely in regard to India. By recognizing the inevitable and by granting independence to India voluntarily, Britain forged a close friendship with India, which has largely forgotten the past. In striking contrast are the narrow attitudes taken by France with regard to Indochina and Algeria and by Holland vis-à-vis Indonesia. Independence that has been achieved by force of arms fosters vengeful sentiments that are not easily forgotten.

THE CONFLICT between Indonesia and the Netherlands, which has become increasingly threatening to world peace, has its origin in the colonial question, namely, in the problem of West Irian, or West New Guinea, as it is still called in the official colonial language of the West. Indonesia regards West Irian as a part of its territory, while the Netherlands claims the right to maintain its colonial rule there--naturally under the pretext of fulfilling its so-called sacred mission of preparing the population for self-government! Here we have a moral argument which the Dutch ignored previously and which they discovered only after they were obliged to relinquish sovereignty over the former Netherlands Indies to Indonesia.

This conflict cannot end until West Irian has been ceded to Indonesia. Every endeavor of the Dutch Government to defer the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia only complicates the problem and creates an atmosphere of mounting tension. Mr. Luns, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently declared in the General Assembly of the United Nations that the Netherlands was ready to place West Irian under United Nations' Trusteeship, and pledged that the Netherlands would continue as before to contribute financially to the development of the territory. In this statement he spoke more like a desperate man than a wise politician, for he was well aware that such a proposal would not effect a solution, since it is unacceptable to Indonesia as a major party to the conflict. If the Netherlands is in fact willing to relinquish sovereignty over West Irian, then why not to Indonesia, which has claimed that disputed land as part of its national territory from the very beginning?

It is worth recalling the origin of the conflict. Article III of the 1947 Linggadjati Agreement, between the Netherlands Govern-

ment and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, states:

> The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies, with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they may establish a special relationship on behalf of such territory with the United States of Indonesia and with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Clearly, according to this article, the Netherlands undertook to relinquish the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies. As for the provisional exception, no part of Indonesia gave notice before the transfer of sovereignty that it was not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia. And it is well known that any separatist movement occurring after Indonesia had become independent was of Dutch manufacture, sponsored and led by units of the Dutch colonial army before their repatriation.

Disagreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands over implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement provided a welcome pretext for the Dutch to launch their first military action, which began in July 1947 and was halted only through the intervention of the United Nations Security Council. Under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee, the Renville Agreement was signed between Indonesia and the Netherlands in January 1948. This was a truce agreement which stipulated that the four principles of the Linggadjati Agreement should form a basis for political discussions. These principles provided for the independence of the Indonesian peoples; cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia; a sovereign Indonesian state on a federal basis and under a constitution that was to be formulated by democratic processes; and a union comprising the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the Queen of the Netherlands.

At that time the Dutch had no intention yet of separating West Irian from the main body of Indonesia, nor was there any mention of such action during the negotiations that followed. The idea was not advanced until after the second military action, when it became clear to everybody that the Dutch-Indonesian conflict could be terminated only by a transfer of sovereignty without an interim transitional period. Plans were subsequently laid for a round-table conference that should have but one objective: the transfer of sovereignty over the former Netherlands Indies to the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

For many Dutch people, who had grown grey in the colonial service, it was very hard to accept the loss of Indonesia. Involved was a loss both of prestige and of what had long been called "the cork supporting the welfare of the Netherlands." The financial

loss could be offset by an economic agreement favoring Dutch interests in Indonesia. But the loss of prestige? Memories of former "colonial glory" could be kept alive only by retaining some part of the former Netherlands Indies under Dutch control. Hence the notion of excluding West Irian from the transfer of sovereignty. Dutch reservations concerning West Irian were mentioned for the first time at the Round Table Conference preparatory meeting in April 1949 at Djakarta, which produced the so-called Roem-Royen Agreement.

At the Round Table Conference at The Hague the Dutch tried to defend their new position by referring to Article III of the Linggadjati Agreement. But they soon admitted the logic of the positions of both Indonesian delegations, which denied the applicability of Article III to the inhabitants of West Irian as long as the great majority of them were not in a position to express their desires. Accordingly, under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Netherlands was obliged to transfer West Irian to Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Dutch insisted on holding West Irian, and were disinclined to listen to opposing arguments.

In an atmosphere of mounting tension the parties agreed to a United Nations formula calling for the maintenance of the status quo in West Irian, with the stipulation that, within a year after the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, the question of West Irian's political status should be determined by negotiation between the governments. After repeated negotiations proved unsuccessful, the Dutch refused to participate in further discussions on the West Irian issue. To the Indonesian contention that the area was part of Indonesia just as it had been part of the Netherlands Indies before the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch replied that there could be no question of a transfer of sovereignty without prior consultation of the inhabitants of West Irian, who would be permitted to exercise the right of self-determination at the appropriate time.

In retaliation against the Dutch withdrawal from their former Linggadjati position, the only course open to the Indonesian Government involved abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian Union in 1956, followed by confiscation of Dutch properties in Indonesia as a temporary political counter-move to the Dutch retention of West Irian. The final step taken by the Indonesian Government was the severing of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.

INDONESIA'S claim to West Irian represents a continuation of her struggle against colonialism, a struggle to complete her national independence. In this effort to achieve the highest ideal there is no place for compromise, as history in all periods has demonstrated. In the course of the accompanying excitement, armed conflict can hardly be avoided. Any such clash of arms, no matter how small, could set off a new world war with all its disastrous conse-

quences for mankind.

Indonesia's claim to West Irian is supported by public opinion in most of Asia and Africa, which have similar problems. It goes without saying that communist countries as well back Indonesia. The Asian-African Conference at Bandung unanimously declared that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end." Since then many African peoples have become independent; and as more peoples become independent, anti-colonial sentiment will become stronger in the world.

The people of the United States, recalling their own history, are anti-colonialist by sentiment. But this sentiment alone is not enough. The United States should actively demonstrate its antipathy for colonialism and should try energetically to wipe out this symbol of injustice. Its indifferent attitude toward colonial conflicts undercuts its own endeavors to maintain world peace.

Like it or not, a basic prerequisite for settling the problems of the present-day world is the recognition of the right of every nation to be independent. Any qualification of this recognition, whatever its pretext, should be condemned. Such recognition should be followed by joint efforts to make independence meaningful and to assist the economically underdeveloped nations in shaping their societies according to their own ideals.

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A NEPALESE HILL VILLAGE AND INDIAN EMPLOYMENT

John T. Hitchcock

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT of the relationship between India and Central Nepal is the close connection arising from the stringencies of hill agriculture on the one hand and the cash value of Indian employment opportunities on the other. The present article examines some of the ways that employment in India (including service in the British army recruited in India) affects the economy of a hill village. The data were obtained during residence in the village in the late winter and spring of 1961.[1]

Banyan Hill is two days' walk south of Pokhara and about one week's walk north of Butwal, near Gorakhpur. Its population (123 persons) is Magar, a tribe found throughout Nepal but concentrated in the central districts south of the Dhaulagiri and Annapurna Himals. It is close to hamlets inhabited by Brahmans, Tailors, Metalworkers, Leatherworkers, and a few other groups such as Ghartis (ex-slaves), Newars, and Gurungs. The 26 farms of Banyan Hill are scattered along a curved wooded ridge about 3,000 feet in altitude. They are surrounded by unirrigated terraces on which the major crops are millet and maize. The irrigated fields of the village lie in the valley bottoms, where water is available, and are used for rice. The climate is moderate, and farming is less difficult than in higher, stonier and less well-watered regions of Central Nepal.

In studying the impact of Indian employment here, it is useful to divide the farms into three groups: (1) the wealthiest ones, with produce to sell and money to lend; (2) those that are not important sources of food or money but are solvent; and (3) farms that either are on the brink of insolvency or have fallen into serious indebtedness.

Employment in India has been of direct consequence to two of the three wealthiest farms. The first, supporting seven persons, produced 92 muri (1 muri = 2.4 bushels) of grain last year. According to local standards, nine muri per person affords a good subsistence, but this family consumed ten muri per person and had a salable surplus of 22 muri. (In this article when calculating muri per person, children under 10 years of age have been given a value of one-half.) It also had loans outstanding valued at 837 rupees.[2] The second of these farms last year produced 95 muri for a family of seven, consumed more than ten muri per person, sold 17 muri, and had loans outstanding valued at 600 rupees. The level of living on both farms is high. Neither has difficulty in providing enough labor to cultivate a large area or in putting by sufficient grain

and cash against bad seasons.

The heads of both of the families in question maintain that money earned in India has been a significant factor in the viability of their farms. One of these, an ex-Subedar (a junior commissioned officer), has a yearly pension of 1,363 rupees. The second farmer, an ex-Havildar (sergeant), draws a yearly pension of 172 rupees and has an unmarried son in the Indian army who returned last year with savings of 2,560 rupees. There can be no doubt of the importance of such earnings in enabling these families to show a surplus and to serve as sources of credit in the community.

It may be noted, in passing, that there are sources of grain and of credit unrelated to employment in India. Within the community the most important such source is the headman, who has one of the largest farms in the region; outside, the most important are neighboring Brahmans. Of the 49 loans to farmers of the community, the headman is the creditor for 11, the Brahmans for 25. (Eight loans have been made by Metalworkers and by Chartis, and five by members of the headman's lineage, to which the ex-Subedar and ex-Havildar belong.)

Direct cash loans are the most common in Banyan Hill. The usual interest rate is 10 per cent yearly and is not compounded. Sometimes the moneylender exacts a gift at the time a loan is made. A note is usually written, specifying the security. Most notes are for ten years. Interest sometimes is paid in the form of labor, or it may be in the form of paddy or of salt, which groups of villagers obtain by trekking to Butwal. Another common method of borrowing is to offer the use of a plot of land in return for a sum of money, on which no other interest is charged. In order to repossess the land, the borrower must repay the money.

The Subedar, the Havildar and the headman have the richest farms in Banyan Hill. In the second group are 11 farms which, while not important sources of food or of money, are economically resilient. Although all but three of these farms have debts, varying in size from 30 to 220 rupees, each of them is ordinarily sufficiently productive to meet the interest payments and eventually to pay off the loans. Two of these farms are in sound condition as a result of employment in India.

One is owned by a pensioner who, on the death of his parents, inherited a small plot of dry land (about one-third acre) which was too small to support a family. He entered the Indian army, and by retirement had saved enough to increase his landholding sixfold. Nevertheless, he still has difficulties. He owns no paddy fields, and to obtain rice has given a loan of 400 rupees in exchange for the use of an irrigated field which yields about 2-1/2 muri. In most years he has to buy grain, but last year the burden was heavier than usual because parrots ate his maize. To obtain a family grain income of nine muri per person--he has a wife and

infant--he had to purchase five muri. With such expenses a less resilient farm would soon be in trouble. Yet this farmer's only debt is for 80 rupees, on which he has paid all the interest. In addition, he owns jewelry on which he would be able to raise at least 300 rupees. Contributing to his economic buoyancy is his and his wife's hard work, sensible management, and the possession of enough dry land to meet his needs for millet and maize. But, as he points out, his favorable position would not be possible without his ex-Havildar's pension of some 364 rupees a year,[3] which enables him to maintain a good level of living. He hopes to be able in the next two years to build up enough of a reserve in grain and cash to warrant his contracting a loan of 500-700 rupees for the purchase of one-third acre of cheap irrigated land; and he expects to be able eventually to buy enough to meet all his needs. He says he would not consider borrowing 500-700 rupees if he did not have a pension with which to meet the interest payments.

The second farm that is in good condition and has an Indian connection is being run by a wife, with occasional help from her half-sister. The husband, a policeman in Assam, sends home money. The importance of this income becomes clear when the woman's situation is compared with that of her next-door neighbor, a childless widow, especially when one realizes that both women once owned about the same amount of land. Including purchases of paddy, which she does not raise because she has no irrigated land, the wife enjoys a family grain income of 15 muri per person. The family grain income of the widow is only eight and one-half muri, three of which must be bought. Both women have to hire some labor, and both purchase some grain. But in order to maintain her good, though much lower, level of living, the widow is falling into debt. She has sold her jewelry, and last year had to sell nearly half of her farmlands to pay off old debts. One plot is being used by a creditor in return for his waiving interest on an old loan of 200 rupees. She has another debt of 330 rupees. Obviously she is unable to make ends meet, and this would be the case, she says, even if all her obligations were cleared and she could start afresh. On the other hand, the wife with a husband in India has not had to sell her jewelry, has no debts, and is owed 180 rupees on a cash loan, plus seven muri of paddy, the latter having a cash value of 210 rupees at current prices.

THE TWELVE FARMS in the third category may be subdivided into three groups. One consists of a single farm, belonging to the only farmer in Banyan Hill who does not own land. He works plots loaned to him by the headman in return for his services as a plowman. A second group (including the widow considered above) comprises six non-resilient farms whose debts are less than 1,000 rupees; and the third group, four families who owe more than this sum. Let us examine the implications of employment in India for farms in the last two categories.

Three farms in the second group are directly affected by such employment. Two of them belong, one each, to the wives of a man who went to India a year ago to work as a chowkidar (watchman) in Calcutta. The first remittance, sent at the end of about a year, was 72 rupees for each wife and 16 rupees for his widowed mother. As an ex-Havildar he also draws a pension of 257 rupees, out of which he last year remitted 67 rupees. Each of the wives has a family grain income of less than six muri per person after the purchase, between the two of them, of three muri of grain. The combined indebtedness of the farms is 791 rupees, and is increasing despite a comparatively low level of living. It is too early to determine the effects of the husband's new job, but it is clear that in taking a job in India the husband seized the only available means of attempting to stem the tide of indebtedness.

The third farm in the group belongs to a retired Havildar Major. A purchase of one-half muri gave him a family grain income of six muri per person last year for a family consisting of a wife, a daughter and three young sons. By living on this amount of grain and using the pension to meet other needs, this family was able to break even. Because the eldest son, age 13, stayed out of school and gave very able assistance, it was only necessary to hire an outside laborer for one day. With his son's help the Havildar Major was able to cut enough green manure to raise production on a rice field from 1-2/3 muri to four muri. Nevertheless, the family remains faced with a serious problem, for it lacks a reserve to tide it over a bad harvest. The Havildar Major estimates that, to be safe, he needs a reserve of 4-1/2 muri. The necessity for an adequate reserve was demonstrated some years ago when he experienced several bad seasons. At that time he could not depend solely on family labor because his children were too young, so he had to hire outside help as well as purchase grain. It was necessary to borrow money and to sell approximately one-third acre of dry land. His cash loans now total 330 rupees, and to repossess some land given for use he will have to pay 840 rupees. Thus, though his farm has shown that it can make ends meet, a single bad year could bring about even heavier indebtedness.

What can this farmer hope for? He could reduce his level of living, but he believes that doing so would jeopardize his family's health; moreover, his status in the community would make such a course difficult. As for the family jewelry, he is determined to keep it for his children's marriages. Although it would seem impossible for him to maintain his present level of living, he faces the future with confidence because in a few years his eldest son should be able to enlist in the Indian army. And in view of the fact that one Banyan Hill son brought 2,560 rupees home after a three-year enlistment, his confidence does not seem unreasonable.

The four farms comprising the third group are in much more desperate straits than the Havildar Major's. Each has a family grain income per person of less than six muri per year; and, to

obtain even this much, four to eight muri must be purchased. Each family has had to sell its jewelry, and their indebtedness ranges from 1,442 to 3,081 rupees.

The farmer most heavily in debt has owed 10 per cent interest on a loan of 500 rupees for 15 years. To prevent interest from accruing on a loan of 700 rupees, he has sent his son to work for his creditor, who feeds the boy. He meets the interest on another loan by yearly salt payments, whose value exceeds an interest rate of 20 per cent. All the other large loans are accruing unpaid interest, with the exception of one for 305 rupees, which is on land given for use. This farmer's trouble began with borrowing to pay for the funerals of his father and brother who died within a week of each other, and was aggravated when two teams of bullocks died. Since these misfortunes his situation has steadily deteriorated. The other three farms are in little better shape.

The ultimate outcome in each case would be landlessness were it not for employment opportunity in India. Three of the farmers are looking to soldier sons for assistance. In one family the eldest son already has enlisted; in the other two there is talk of enlistment soon. The future looks darkest for the fourth farmer, who lacks a son old enough to enlist and who is reluctant to go to India in search of work because he does not wish to leave his dependents. The most important deterrent is the fact that his brother (the ex-Havildar with two wives) has already gone, leaving him as the sole male representative of the lineage.

The financial difficulties of these farms in a village that is representative of many other Magar villages in Central Nepal indicate that serious hardship would result if opportunities for work outside Nepal did not exist. If for any reason these opportunities were withdrawn, many farmers would become landless laborers. In present circumstances foreclosure is very frequently held in abeyance because the creditor foresees the possibility of Indian employment for sons, or even for the father, and is willing to wait and take his substantial profit in cash rather than in land.

These examples also place Magar army enlistment in perspective. Not all enlistment results from economic considerations. Military rank is important in the village status structure, as the number of enlistments from well-to-do families suggests. But, by and large, the main reason for enlistment, as for seeking civilian employment in India, is the pressure of indebtedness and, ultimately, the increasing pressure of population upon a difficult and unproductive environment.

NOTES

1. Field work in Banyan Hill was part of a study, still in prog-

ress, of ecological variation and its correlates financed by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The author's wife participated in all phases of the work, and Hem Bahadur Thapa and Hari Ram Rana assisted.

2. Values are in Nepalese currency. One Nepalese rupee is approximately equivalent to two-thirds of an Indian rupee.

3. Differences in pensions for the same grade reflect different lengths and conditions of service.

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RASAH--A RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE IN MALAYA

Hamzah-Sendut

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, officially concluded in August 1960 after 12 years of anti-communist war, was responsible for the creation of more than 400 resettlement villages, or "new villages." In the process, some half-million persons were removed from isolated rural locations to compact settlements established for this special purpose. Begun in June 1948, the scheme was completed in 1954 without causing widespread unemployment--an achievement unparalleled in all of Southeast Asia--and was especially noteworthy because it coincided with a period when the Federation of Malaya was preparing itself for self-government and eventual independence.

The present article describes certain of the principles underlying the development of one of these villages--Rasah New Village in the State of Negri Sembilan--since its inception more than a decade ago. Although this village, which lies about 3-1/2 miles distant from the town of Seremban on the road to Port Dickson, is not a "typical" one, it does exhibit many basic features that are characteristic of other resettlement villages.

Rasah New Village was created as a result of resettlement in contrast to regrouping. Suspected communist sympathisers and "squatters" were compulsorily shifted from Temiang, Labu, Sikamat, Mambau and other areas on the outskirts of Seremban and were resettled in the villages specially laid out for them. Altogether, 2,218 persons, including 962 children below the age of 14, were involved in the process; adult women outnumbered men, some of whom escaped resettlement by taking refuge in the nearby town. All of the settlers were Chinese except for 15 Indians, comprising two families of retired government servants. The only Malay element in the village consisted of the families of police constables who were posted there for security purposes. Essentially, therefore, the village was a racial one from the outset.

Rasah New Village was established primarily as a military expedient, for the purposes of localising terrorist activities, preventing communist gains in the area, and promoting an early conclusion of the Emergency in the Seremban district. It was situated therefore within easy reach of effective government control and police supervision. Although the chosen instrument was the civil administration headed by the district officer of Seremban and assisted by other officials, the military and police authorities responsible for the security of the whole area were influential in the choice of a location that was accessible from all directions.

At first a site of 250 acres of flat, low land on the Seremban-Port Dickson main road was chosen in order to facilitate military movements and supply; but this was abandoned after heavy rains in November 1951 flooded the whole village and caused serious damage to both houses and fields. The present site, some 108 acres of gently undulating land, purchased from estate owners at the prevailing market price, is not liable to flooding except along the immediate margins of the Sungai Linggi River. It was chosen for its proximity not only to Seremban but also to rubber estates that provide employment for many of the settlers.

The area was surveyed before occupation and was divided into 500 parcels for dwellings, shops and public use. The standard plot for each dwelling was 50 by 100 feet, and for each shop, 20 by 100 feet. The assistant resettlement officer distributed these parcels of land by drawing lots to prevent discrimination. No areas were reserved for possible future expansion of population, nor, because the village is close to Seremban, was land allocated for government offices, but areas were provided for a community centre, a youth club, a school and a religious building.

The considerable size of the project required the expenditure of large sums by the government of the State of Negri Sembilan. There was also abundant private assistance in the form of both money and personal services. The Malayan Chinese Association (Seremban Branch), the British Red Cross Society, the St. John's Ambulance Brigade, and church and missionary councils among other organisations cooperated on the project. Army personnel assisted in laying out roads and levelling land for house sites.

THE CREATION OF Rasah New Village, which was one of the first new villages in the country, introduced a "social revolution" by setting up a compact community different from the traditional fragmented or open villages that are prevalent in rural Malaya. A new type of village was created, as a matter of policy, in which settlers could live and work in close proximity: in Rasah the distance between one's residence and place of work does not exceed four miles--an easy distance for travel by bicycle. Moreover, with a regular bus service linking Seremban with Port Dickson, and lorries shuttling between neighbouring estates and the village, travelling time is minimal.

Because the families in the village live close together, it has been economically feasible to introduce electricity, piped water for domestic consumption, and certain other amenities. Thus oil lamps have given place to electric light in each house; and whereas previously the residents of Rasah depended upon the Sungai Linggi River for both drinking water and sewage disposal, they now have a safe water-supply system. It is not too much to say that in general, for the first time in rural Malaya, living conditions have been raised to conform to modern standards.

The removal of scattered families into relatively congested settlements also meant a new way of life for many of them. With a population of more than 2,000, Rasah New Village acquired political status--and responsibilities. Among other things, house construction in the village must meet certain standards: the use of such short-lived materials as bamboo and rough-hewn planks is restricted in favour of bricks, stone, and cement; and almost all of the dwellings have roofs of zinc or aluminium sheets instead of thatch. A few houses, however, are dilapidated. Although no standard plan is available, house construction in the village requires the prior approval of the District Officer. The average housing density is maintained at three to four houses to the acre. To prevent land speculation the government has forbidden the transfer of property titles in less than 10 years; after this period, a transfer becomes effective only with the express consent of the local Council in consultation with the District Officer.

Village hygiene is maintained through the disposal of sewage and garbage under the supervision of a subcommittee of the local Council. Two conservancy labourers remove night soil and dispose of it in the Sungai Linggi below the village. A weeder is employed to keep the roads and drains clean while at the same time collecting refuse and burning it in an incinerator outside the village. Fly-breeding nuisances are reduced to a minimum by frequent visits on the part of health inspectors from Seremban who also conduct anti-malarial measures. The purity of food served in the local eating stalls and shops is ensured by the issuance of licences; hawkers receive a free medical examination annually. With regard to medical services, the settlers share the facilities provided by the Seremban General Hospital, which is about two miles away. In addition, a mobile clinic appears once a week at the local Council office, where minor ailments are treated. The village also employs two resident midwives.

The village primary school, with more than 500 pupils, is run by a board that includes representatives of earlier graduates, parents who are also leading citizens, and members of the government education department. The board recruits its own teachers with the advice of the State education officer. About 50 children attend secondary schools in Seremban. There are special classes for overage pupils in the afternoons; adult classes in the national language are held at night.

The community centre, a forum for the discussion of village and national affairs, includes a coffee shop; the youth club provides a meeting place for young people; and the school playing-field affords adequate space for football, badminton, basketball, and the annual village athletic meet. There is also a branch of the Scouting movement. Each week the government department of information services entertains the villagers with documentary films about Malaya, and during weekends many patronize the Seremban cinema halls.

The administration of the village is reserved mainly to the residents, who in 1954 formed a local Council of nine members. These are elected annually. A paid clerk looks after the records.

Rasah New Village is almost self-supporting financially. It is empowered to raise revenues by imposing assessments on property. Most of its income comes from assessments on buildings, at the monthly rate of M$1.50 per house and M$3 per shop. Fees are also collected for conservancy services and for licences to sell pork, fish, poultry and vegetables, or to operate coffee shops or food stalls. As for expenditures, wages are paid to employees of the local Council who are responsible for the routine affairs of the village, such as the maintenance of roads, drains, bridges, open spaces, street lighting and sanitary dustbins. The village budget for 1959 is reproduced in the accompanying table.

Rasah New Village is predominantly agricultural: 80 per cent of its gainfully employed residents are engaged in market gardening or in rubber tapping or in both activities, which are generally sufficiently remunerative to provide a livelihood. The earnings of a rubber-tapper on a neighbouring estate average between M$3 and M$4 per day; a market gardener earns between M$60 and M$80 per month. About 5 per cent of the settlers are engaged in shopkeeping or other tertiary activities, and 1 per cent in tin mining; data on their incomes are not available. Although unemployment is not a major problem, many settlers pursue two occupations, i.e., a wage-earning activity in the morning and market gardening in the afternoon; and a few families also raise pigs and chickens.

The economic health of the village depends to a considerable extent on agriculture, in which land is the most important factor. Unfortunately, the manner in which land was distributed has been the least satisfactory aspect of the history of Rasah New Village. In addition to a house plot, each agricultural family received one and one-half acres for cultivation purposes.[1] No land of this kind was allocated to shopkeepers or to wage earners. The land shortage therefore is acute, and many settlers must cultivate land illegally outside the village perimeter, while others have obtained plots elsewhere on temporary occupation licences, with little prospect of gaining ownership, or have reclaimed swamplands by the river for pisciculture. Although statistics are lacking, a few settlers are known to have moved to Seremban, and others have returned to their former living areas where they at least have sufficient land, even though the amenities of village life are absent. The resettlement at Rasah also took some workers away from their former jobs in the Mambau tin-mining area; numbers of these had to change occupations and to move to Seremban in search of employment. There are no cottage industries in the village.

Any shift of population in a plural society is likely to have both social and political consequences. Rasah New Village, as noted earlier, is predominantly Chinese. In fact, in the Seremban

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES FOR 1959

Expenditures		Revenues	
Administration	M$ 3,110	Assessments on buildings	M$ 7,000
Conservancy	2,096	Conservancy	2,274
Scavenging	1,384	Licence fees	264
Maintenance of buildings	500	Fees for building plans	50
Maintenance of roads, drains and bridges	1,500	House transfer fees	70
Maintenance of open spaces	1,744	Sale of hawking licence plates	20
Street lighting	1,500	Sanitary pails and dustbins	150
Sanitary pails and dustbins	400	Government balancing grant	3,501
Road signs	150		
Licence plates	50		
Fees for prosecution	20		
Fees for audit	225		
Personal emoluments	650		
Total Expenditures	M$13,329	Total Revenues	M$13,329

area as a whole, Malay regrouping has been less extensive than Chinese resettlement, and it is regrettable that the Emergency was not made an occasion for social change. From the outset Rasah has been a racial village, as have many others in the country. Often when opportunities have arisen through regrouping or resettlement, the major communities have not been brought together in intercommunal villages. Thus, the Emergency unintentionally intensified existing concentrations of ethnic groups and encouraged each community to remain distinct from the others. The present-day task of consolidating these groups into a single Malayan nation would have been greatly facilitated if Malays, Chinese and Indians had been brought together in common villages.

The resettlement scheme at Rasah did, however, achieve one of its main objects: it severed the close ties existing between the armed communists in the jungle and the unprotected rural populations by food denials, wire fencing and police protection. And yet, who is to say whether the removal of people from the outlying districts of Temiang, Labu, Sikamat, and Mambau has in fact eradicated communism in those areas? In any case, even though there has been no recurrence of insurgent activities in the village or outside it, every effort must be made to provide the settlers with an environment in which they are assured of effective protection and a rising level of living.

To recapitulate, then, although it was conceived as a military necessity, the establishment of Rasah New Village improved the living conditions of some 2,000 peasants. Nevertheless, certain difficulties remain. The economic base of the village is unstable because of insufficient land for food production, a lack of cottage industries, and the uncertain prospects of the rubber industry. In the face of these problems, it will be difficult to prevent settlers from drifting away into Seremban or to outlying rural areas where they might revert to past practices. Further development under the government's new five-year plan (1961-65) will therefore be essential if Rasah New Village is to become a permanent feature of the Malayan landscape.

NOTE

1. Nowadays resettlement schemes for landless farmers allow 10-1/4 acres per family (of approximately five persons): six acres for rubber, two for rice, two for fruit, and one-quarter acre for the house.

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WILL SUCCESS SPOIL THE JAPANESE?

David W. Plath

JAPAN'S RISE TO RICHES has inspired many. In recent years scholars in many different disciplines have probed the Japanese experience, attempting to explain why the Japanese have been able so swiftly to scale the heights up to what the Rostow lexicon calls "high mass-consumption." The lessons learned here have obvious practical uses in the economic development of "new nations" elsewhere. But evidence from the current scene suggests that the Japanese case may have still further uses, that it may have lessons as well for the overdeveloped nations.

What happens after development? Are the struggling nations fated to find that at the end of the rainbow lies not happiness but the Leisure Problem? Are the Japanese sloughing off their version of the Protestant Ethic? Will success spoil the Japanese?

Social forecasting still is at the wet-finger-in-the-wind stage. But even this much allows us to make cautious inferences as to whether the wind is blowing.

Global news media have made it known that the Japanese are not far behind the field in the international race for the affluent good life. At this date scarcely anyone needs to be told that Japan is having a "leisure boom." Least of all the Japanese themselves, who at times seem almost morbidly self-conscious about it. "Leisure" (rejaa) was nominated as one of the most popular foreign words to gain currency last year, and there has been a spasm of books and articles with titles such as "This Year Let's Play!" and "Spending Is a Virtue."[1]

Other evidence is plentiful. Some of it is grandiose: e.g., the Welfare Ministry has a 21,000 million-yen program for building "national recreation villages" in parks throughout the country. And some of it is more humble: e.g., in the Nagano farming community where I lived in 1960 (a middling sort of community economically), the PTA took up a collection and presented the middle school with a swimming pool. But behind these events, behind the fads for beer drinking and bike racing, one senses a change in attitudes. It seems that in an age when rice is in oversupply and there are six million television sets in the land, people no longer can find secure refuge in hackneyed phrases about poverty and overpopulation.

Indications are that the Japanese are groping toward new valuations of many aspects of daily life, but let us limit ourselves to

a brief look at three of these.

First of all, a new conception of time. This comes to the surface partly in the form of demands for more "time off." Mass media, unions, and the Labor Standards Bureaus are campaigning energetically for a "weekly holiday system"--at least one day of non-work each week for all employees. Ideally this should be on Sunday (as in the West) and ideally all stores and workshops should close down on this day (to prevent cheating). In rural areas the villagers are being urged to establish "farm holidays" once a month at minimum. Nationally one faction of the Liberal-Democrat Party has been capturing headlines with a plan for doubling or even trebling the list of national holidays. And there have been cries of shame because International Labor Office figures put Japan well behind other industrial nations in efforts to shorten the average working week (a fraction over 50 hours for Japan, in contrast to 40 for the U.S. and Canada).[2]

But this is not just a question of quantity. There is a felt need to plan time, to be more thoughtful about its uses. Housewives are told that they will "gain" as much as two hours of free time a day if only they will schedule their chores. Leaders of the Living Reform (seikatsu kaizen) movements have been coming up with brainstorms such as the Triple Eight (8-8-8 undoo). This echoes a familiar Western folk notion to work eight hours, sleep eight hours, and have eight hours of fun. On another level, many producers' cooperatives have been toying with what is euphemistically called the Farmers' Salary System. Under this, the farmer leaves the proceeds from his crop sales on deposit with the co-op treasurer. Farmer and treasurer decide upon an amount to be set aside for the purchase of seeds, fertilizer, and supplies. Then the remainder is paid back to the farmer in monthly installments as a "salary." The avowed aim is to encourage monthly farm-family budgeting. (And the not-so-avowed aim, perhaps, to furnish the cooperatives with some added short-term working capital).[3]

Time may not quite equate with money, as it did for Poor Richard. And we have to be careful not to exaggerate the degree of change: there are instances of temples in feudal Edo that "sold" time by striking the temple bells regularly and dunning the neighbors for this service. But in any event it is clear that in a Japan of village-wide telephones and nation-wide television, traditional pathways of life-in-time no longer can be followed thoughtlessly.

Secondly, an eagerness to make life easier. Even among traditionally hard-working villagers a man can win kudos by "consumption pioneering," as David Riesman calls it. In fact, some Japanese rural sociologists already see signs of wasteful over-investment in expensive chemical spray machines and in gas cultivators with more horsepower than needed.

That technical progress will continue to ease the irksome chores of daily life, is now taken as a standard article of faith. None of my villagers knew of the nineteenth-century British gentleman and archaeologist Pitt-Rivers, who organized a famous museum to demonstrate human progress in tools and implements. But they were carrying on the spirit of Pitt-Rivers in 1960 as they scavenged their attics for old plows, threshing racks (semba-koki) and oil lamps. These they donated to the primary school, which organized a permanent exhibit to prove to the youngsters that life has been growing ever more comfortable.

On the national scene it seems indicative that the "three Imperial treasures" (the sword, mirror, and jewel of the venerated Imperial regalia) are being parodied as the "three imperial treasures of the good life" (bunka seikatsu no sanshuu no jingi). These consist of consumer durables. Lists vary, but a typical one includes (1) an automobile, (2) an electric washer, and (3) a room cooler.

In short, the classical pose of indifference to or even defiance of creature comforts--the samurai stance of chewing a toothpick while starving--now is in disfavor.

Thirdly, new attitudes toward work and play. Japanese sociologists and market analysts have in the past few years been energetically fingering the pulse of public opinion on this question. The data are not ringingly conclusive, but the consensus seems to be that the Japanese now think it much more respectable to amuse oneself than they did in the past.[4]

This, however, raises a historical problem. More respectable than which past? one wonders. More respectable than during the dark days of the 1940s perhaps. But were the Japanese of the 1920s--or of the Genroku era--so loath to have a bit of fun? Japanese opinion-pollers, like their Western counterparts, have an annoyingly shallow sense of history.

Anyway, possibly the most telling evidence is the very fact that so many researchers are finding the issue worth raising. And surely it is a long way from the Onna Daigaku to a recent handbook series for young ladies, with its volume on "Pleasures of Living."[5] What does seem new is the activist tenor in Japanese play today. One senses it in the weekend urban exodus to the hot springs and mountain trails. Or in the new crop of guides for the Sunday carpenter, painter, or handyman. Some newspapers have urged that everyone needs a two-day weekend: one day for golf and home chores, and another in which to rest up for the hard working week ahead.

However, the activists still do not seem to have demolished the much older Japanese attitude that on your day off you really don't have to do a blessed thing. I suspect that for most Japanese today holidays still are days of quiet good cheer--days of "compli-

ments and mutual civilities," as Kaempfer described them for seventeenth-century Nagasaki.

Furthermore, it seems too soon to conclude that Japanese norms of diligence are in discard, although the "worker hero" Ninomiya now is a target for jeers. (Several antique dealers told my wife that they no longer carry the famous Ninomiya statue in stock; no demand.) One still meets many men and women who are carrying on devotedly and energetically--Japanese counterparts, perhaps, to what Eric Larrabee has called the Protestant Ethic Underground.

And yet the Japanese seem to have reached the end of innocence. More and more the Living Reform-ettes are demanding that the Japanese male cheerfully spend his day-off tending babies so that his wife will be free to go out. Out to Reform rallies, apparently.

One final, more hopeful thought. With leisure looming as a home-front social problem, the Japanese seem to be looking with new eyes at the American experiment in consuming the fruits of the industrial horn of plenty. And indications are that at least one Asian people is coming to be less naively scornful of "coca-cola culture," coming to see it as more to be pondered than censured.

NOTES

1. E.g., "Kotoshi wa asobimashoo," Shuukan Yomiuri, January 1, 1961, pp. 20-26; Ishii Kinnosuke, Shoohi wa bitoku de aru, 1960, Tooyoo Keizai Shimpo Sha.

2. On the holiday "boom," see my "Land of the Rising Sunday," Japan Quarterly, Vol. 7, 1960, pp. 357-61; and "Overworked Japan and the Holiday Demiurge," Today's Japan, Vol. 5, 1960, pp. 61-64.

3. On farmers' salaries see Namiki Shookichi, Nooson wa kawaru, 1960, pp. 61-69, Iwanami Shinsho #388.

4. Most of the work of the Tokyo University Newspaper Research Institute so far has been published only in short notices in the daily press. The Japan Productivity Board brought out the results of one of its own surveys in January 1961: Nihon Seisansei Hombu, "Dai-sanji sangyoo ni kansuru shoohisha dookoo choosa," 4 vols., mimeo.

5. "Seikatsu no tanoshimi," Vol. 8 of Gendai josei kooza, 1960, Kadokawa Shoten.

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UNITED STATES AID TO LATIN AMERICA IN CHINESE STUDIES

John K. Fairbank and John M. H. Lindbeck

STUDY OF CHINESE language and culture is a humanistic technology, complex and time-consuming, which is nevertheless important and necessary for every modern people. Mainland China will have increasing contact with other countries, and through size alone will increasingly claim their attention. Understanding China will become more and more necessary in years ahead. Direct contact will provide a valuable basis for such understanding, but serious study will be even more essential for any people who want to have their own, independent view of Chinese problems.

The development of Chinese studies in the Spanish-speaking world has special importance. Only Chinese, English and Russian are spoken by more people than Spanish. Together the Spanish and Portuguese cultural worlds include more nations than any other, and their 230 million people are exceeded in number only by the Chinese and the people of English-speaking countries. Yet Chinese studies are almost non-existent in the countries where Spanish and Portuguese are used. This is in contrast to the situation in Russia, the United States and several countries in Europe and Asia where universities have long supported systematic study and research on China. In the Philippines a bare beginning is being made in developing the academic study of China, but no regular instruction or centers of Chinese studies whatever appear to exist or be in prospect in Latin America.

Meanwhile the century-old but rather meager economic and immigrational ties between China and Latin America have entered upon a new and active phase in the last few years. Cultural relations have expanded since 1950. By 1960 there were about 25 societies for Chinese culture and friendship in Latin America, among the older and larger ones being the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute (1952), the Mexican Society for Friendship with People's China (1953), the Chinese-Brazilian Cultural Society (1954), and the Argentine Association of Chinese Culture (1955). The interest of political groups has been quickened through the visits of Latin American parliamentary leaders and groups to China. From mid-1956 to the end of 1959, officials or groups of officials from nine countries in Latin America visited China, including such personages as the ex-President of Mexico, the former Vice President of Chile, and the former President of the Chamber of Deputies in Bolivia. On the Chinese side interest in Latin America is manifested in Spanish-language broadcasts from China; these have increased from seven hours a week when they began in 1957 to 21 hours in 1959. A Spanish edition of China Reconstructs began to circulate in these

countries in 1960, as did Spanish translations of Mao's works and many others. Cultural delegations from the China Mainland have been warmly received in many cities. Trading relations are still slight but have increased, reaching a volume of $20 million in 1959. Relations with the Chinese on Formosa are primarily diplomatic, except for Cuba, although Brazil has admitted several thousand Chinese immigrants from Formosa to open new areas for farming.

As relations between China and the countries of Central and South America grow, the need for understanding, perspective and informed and independent judgment about China increases. This cannot be achieved through the haphazard fluctuations of cultural exchanges and political and economic developments. Such understanding needs to be developed in Latin America, as elsewhere, as a serious intellectual and cultural pursuit.

Chinese studies, using the Chinese written language, require a special investment of training time. With the most intensive modern methods, it still requires about five years for non-Chinese scholars to develop an effective working knowledge of the spoken language and writing system. If they also pursue advanced training in history, economics or other social sciences, the combined training program will take eight to ten years. This is not only because the written language is difficult and ramified but also because Chinese culture is the most distinctively different from other world cultures. Non-Chinese studying China have much to learn before they can form independent scholarly judgments which are as soundly based and sophisticated as are their judgments about other cultures.

This view is based on thirty years' experience in Chinese studies at Harvard, where the Harvard-Yenching Institute has helped to build up a pre-eminent library of 250,000 volumes and a highly trained staff of language teachers and other specialists. Since 1930 the Rockefeller Foundation and since World War II the Ford Foundation and others have aided the growth of a dozen major centers of Chinese studies in North American universities. Recently the federal government has also provided scholarships and translation services. Yet few would say that Chinese studies in this country today are as yet adequate to the United States' need for understanding China.

Because of the start that has been made in the United States, and also because of the formidable scholarly difficulties encountered, we believe that universities in Latin America should be forthwith encouraged and aided to develop their own centers of Chinese studies. The experience and facilities of North American universities should be made available to help the establishment of independent sinological scholarship in Latin America.

Naturally, study about a country is no substitute for visiting it. Yet a visit to mainland China today, without any ability to

use the written or spoken language or any background of the facts of China's history, is also an inadequate basis for understanding and judgment. As a basis for educating his own students about China in his own university, a professor needs both direct contact and prolonged study.

Chinese studies are of course essential for understanding China's modern problems and how to deal with them. But the main reason for study of Chinese history and culture is to include the Chinese quarter of mankind in one's picture of the human scene and so encompass the full horizon of human experience. The history of Chinese civilization, though as yet relatively unstudied in Western countries, forms a significant portion of the human record and is accordingly important for sociology, political science, comparative literature and other modern fields of learning. The Peking government today is undertaking a large-scale reinterpretation of Chinese history. Some of its new views may be illuminating, some may seem tendentious, but in any case there is no reason why China should monopolize the understanding of China's past, which has much to offer all mankind.

The scientific study of China's traditional civilization (Sinology) has had a long development in Japan and Europe, as well as in the United States, and has produced an invaluable corpus of dictionaries, translations, monographs and study aids which are essential tools for all non-Chinese students in this field, who share a common need for this kind of assistance in their work.

Proposals for action. In the course of the inter-American alliance for progress, there should be made available to universities in Latin America an opportunity to use the United States training facilities in the difficult technique of Sinology. Our experience suggests several operating principles.

1. Latin American scholars sent to North American centers for this purpose should ordinarily be past the first years of advanced academic training, of proven ability and thoroughly committed to scholarly pursuits, but they should be young enough to acquire new linguistic skills easily and to create new specialties when they return to their universities. An age level between 25 and 35 is indicated.

2. Candidates should be nominated by their universities but in somewhat larger number than can be selected. Final selection should be determined partly by the candidates' acceptance at centers in the United States.

3. Study should be expected to extend over a two- or three-year period in the first instance, subject to annual review, with a presumption of subsequent further opportunity for travel, study elsewhere, or continued study in the United States. The cognate principles here involved are that a candidate should not be too

long away from his home university, and yet should have a chance for up to five years of solid preparation.

4. Trainees should be fluent in English as a language of instruction. Each should be encouraged to develop his own special interest within the large area of Chinese studies, with a faculty supervisor's assistance. As soon as possible he should begin reading Chinese materials of all sorts germane to this special interest. In due time he should expect to go for a period of residence in China, although such arrangements are beyond the scope of the present proposal.

5. As a form of pump priming, universities in Latin America should be aided to send to Harvard (or other United States centers) one or more established faculty members for a year's non-linguistic study of Chinese history and civilization, on the model of the college teachers brought to Harvard in recent years under a Ford grant as Fellows in East Asian Studies. Such professors, though specialized in other fields, have been able in a year's free time, using Harvard facilities and instruction, to prepare themselves effectively for college teaching about East Asia. In short, instruction should be developed as soon as possible, without waiting for the above-mentioned training program to produce finished sinologists.

6. We offer this proposal with special reference to our own facilities at Harvard, but we see no reason why it should not be pursued on a national scale, perhaps by a national committee.

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